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Prescript 
 
Fisheries and aquaculture have played an important role in providing global food security and 
income to people relying on this sector. It is estimated that fish consumption per capita has 
increased in developing and developed countries [FAO, 2016:2], and over 56 million people 
worldwide were engaged in capture fisheries and aquaculture activities in 2014 [FAO, 2016:5]. 
Thus, fisheries and aquaculture have become crucial contributors not only to regional socio- 
economic development but also to the livelihood of fishing communities. 
 However, world capture fisheries, primarily marine capture fisheries have declined or 
remained stagnant in many parts of the world [FAO, 2016:3-4], and inland water captures are also 
severely threatened [Harrison and Stiassny, 1999; Post et al., 2002; Welcomme et al., 2014:iv]. 
Capture declines could be attributed to the overexploitation and depletion of aquatic resources 
[FAO, 2010a:42; FAO, 2014:7]. In contrast to the stagnation of capture fisheries, aquaculture 
production has grown rapidly since the 1980s with the introduction of new farming technologies 
and innovation systems. The trends in this sector indicate that it will continue growing to meet 
the increasing demand for fish commodities [FAO, 2010b:3-5].  
 In Latin America, aquaculture production began to develop since the 1970s and this 
region became one of the main producers in the world [FAO, 2010a:6; FAO, 2014:20]. The major 
contributors to the growth have been Chile, Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico in order of importance 
by production volume from 2006 to 2008 [Wurmann, 2012:11]. In particular, Chile has shown a 
sustained growth in salmon farming production, competing at the global level with Norway. The 
development of the salmon farming industry in Chile started at the end of the 1960s under the 
technical and financial cooperation project granted by the government of Japan and evolved 
rapidly after the 1980s owing to increasing international demand [Hosono, 2010]. In view of the 
successful results, aquaculture development programs were expanded in other Latin American 
countries, such as Bolivia [JICA, 1992; Hamamitsu et al., 1998] and Argentina [Uez, 1995; 
Nagasawa, 1997:25-32]. 
The inadequate development programs and the lack of a regulatory and enforcement 
framework can negatively affect the sustainable fish production and will have an adverse effect 
on the environment in the long run. The central governments may facilitate the development of 
aquaculture projects, but as stated by Smith and Peterson, adequate background research on 
socioeconomic, cultural, traditional, legislative, and technical factors of the region in which fish 
farming is to be introduced is crucial to avoid pitfalls [Smith and Peterson, 1982:1-9]. Martínez-
Espinosa and Barg add that the environmental, scientific, political, and institutional factors should 
also be considered in aquaculture development planning, particularly for those projects that have 
strong governmental intervention [Martínez-Espinoza and Barg, 1993:42].  
2 
 
Based on the importance of aquaculture development, our previous research has focused 
on the aquaculture projects implemented in some Latin American countries. It was found that 
several factors, including resource use patterns, and government and private sector collaboration 
affected the development of fish farming projects. Although the salmon industry in Chile has 
shown a sustained growth, except for periods of virus outbreaks, the development of trout farming 
in Bolivia has contributed to the promotion of local production. In Argentina, an attempt was 
made to promote intensive salmonid farming; however, it did not prosper as in Chile because of 
the lack of demand and inadequate commitment of stakeholders [Luchini and Huidobro, 2008] at 
the national level. The fish farming programs have contributed to promoting recreational fisheries 
in Argentina [JICA, 2009; Wegrzyn and Ortubay, 2009:290-300]. Recreational fishing is 
generally regarded as a leisure activity of the wealthy upper or middle classes, however, it 
represents an important social pastime and a source of food to the local popular sector in many 
developing countries, including Argentina. However, the effects that this segment can generate in 
terms of conservation issues have not been focused on in previous studies. 
Cooke and Cowx assert that even though it is largely commercial fisheries that are 
criticized for overexploiting aquatic resources, recreational fisheries can also alter the fish 
population. They argue that the latter has fewer access restrictions, catches are not completely 
reflected on fish landings reports, and the governments usually disregard its effects on fish stocks 
[Cooke and Cowx, 2006]. Therefore, institutional factors should be included in designing and 
improving the recreational fishing schemes.  
Recreational fishing has grown substantially in Argentina. Its management and 
conservation policies have been based on a top down regime, but this type of system can generate 
adverse effects in the use of resources and degrade the environment. As Anderson Jr. stated, when 
the central authorities impose the rules that are not congruent with the local needs, the 
management of resources may fail to affect economic returns [Anderson Jr., 1987:327-334]. 
Therefore, in view of the importance of resource management and conservation, the present 
research was intended to focus on inland recreational fishing in Argentina, underscoring the 
implications of communication and cooperation among stakeholders to sustain this activity in the 
long term. The inland fisheries were selected because they have been the focus of few studies 
compared with marine fisheries. It was not the intent to measure the fish population to define an 
appropriate management model, rather the objective was to demonstrate how fisheries regulations 
of the government can improve the use of common pool resources (CPRs) at the local and regional 
level.  
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Preface 
 
Background of the research 
 
The trends in world capture fisheries and aquaculture indicate that the appropriate formulation of 
resource management is crucial to sustaining the use of water common-pool resources (CPRs). 
Internationally, cooperation and agreements among the countries have led to the regulation of the 
catches, such as that of tuna stock in the high seas [Japan’s Fisheries Agency, 2009]. Although 
the top down regimes still predominate domestically, the governments and local fishermen have 
at times been successful in developing alliances to conserve resources, as occurred with lobster 
production in Maine [Acheson, 1975; Ostrom, 2008:12]. Inland fisheries can also function under 
the co-management regime involving local fishers in decision making, as occurred for Victoria 
Lake and the establishment of Beach Management Units (BMUs) [Welcomme et al., 2014:67]. 
Even though one of the most common users of inland waters are commercial and recreational 
fishers, the impacts of the latter on the resource system have been largely unnoticed or not 
reflected in global catches. Thus, Cooke and Cowx suggest that the effect of recreational fishing 
on fish stocks should not be overlooked [Cooke and Cowx, 2006:94-95].  
However, although recreational fishing is an extractive activity, Pitcher states that it has 
the potential to reconcile the use of living aquatic resources with conservation. He argues that 
catch-and-release and participation in habitat restoration may help to conserve the fish 
populations [Pitcher and Hollingworth, 2002:xii]. Furthermore, Granek et al. attest that 
recreational fishers may contribute to the conservation of fish resources when involved in the 
development of fishing regulations [Granek et al., 2008:1127]. Cooke et al. state that formal 
institutions or regulations imposed by the centralized governments can be complemented by 
informal institutions (or voluntary rules and habits) with the aim of conserving common resources 
[Cooke et al., 2013:439]. Therefore, the informal institutions and the involvement or participation 
of local anglers in the design of fishing regulations can help to achieve management goals.  
 Attempts to promote recreational fisheries in Argentina began with the introduction of 
exotic salmonids species into the inland waters of the northern Patagonia region in the early 1900s 
[Wegryn and Ortubay, 2009:24]. The pristine water conditions have led to the survival of trout 
and salmon species, enabling the expansion of recreational fishing in the region. It is estimated 
that periodical salmonid farming and restocking programs have contributed to maintaining the 
population since its introduction [Macchi, 2004; Macchi et al. 2008]. In terms of fishing 
regulations, the inland water resources of the Patagonian region have been managed under 
uniform and standardized fishing rules crafted by the member provinces and implemented through 
local stakeholders on consultation. However, the fisheries resource management and conservation 
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in the Pampas region, located in the eastern central part of the country, are held primarily under 
the direction of the central government. As a result, the institutional framework and the 
enforcement system have remained weak and inefficient [Baigún and Delfino, 2001:136-137; 
Grosman, 2001:187]. Inland recreational fishing is a popular and economically important activity 
in the region that not only provides an informal social space, but is also a source of food to some 
local fishers.  
 
Linking human security to recreational fisheries 
The concept of human security began to expand internationally after the report of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) addressed the new global crisis in the 1990s. The 
report predicted that the end of the Cold War and the progress of the globalization combined with 
the liberalization of the economy and information technology expose the world to new influences 
that may threaten humanity. The narrow and traditional interpretation of the security linked to 
territorial protection and political interests should be changed to integrated security of the 
livelihood and dignity of human beings. The document emphasized the need to confront the 
threats that affect economic, food, and environmental securities [UNDP 1994]. The Commission 
on Human Security establishes that human security complements the traditional state security, 
and defined it as the protection of “the vital core of all human lives …”, pointing out the need to 
create political, social, environmental, and other systems safeguarding people’s lives 
[Commission on Human Security 2003:2-4].  
 As earlier mentioned, recreational fisheries are widely regarded as a leisure activity. 
However, the food security component and its implications for local people are often overlooked. 
In Argentina, recreational fishing is a popular activity that not only provides an important social 
space that enables the interaction and communication between the anglers and their families or 
friends, but also contributes to food security. The contribution to food security is related to the 
chronic national economic instability. Recreational fishing helps to bring food to the home, 
reducing the economic burden of resource-poor local households. In terms of environmental 
conservation, unlike commercial fisheries, recreational fisheries can contribute to preserving the 
aquatic resources. The human dimension of recreational fisheries matters since it can enhance the 
management and conservation outcomes, including the practice of catch-and-release, voluntary 
informal rules, and the participation of anglers in fishing management programs. Moreover, it 
helps to promote local or regional tourism and reinforces local communities.  
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Conceptual framework of sustainable development 
Although concerns over sustainability date back to Malthus1 and Meadows2, the concept of 
sustainable development evolved [Drexhage and Murphy, 2010:7] when the world’s political 
leaders began to debate issues concerning environment and development at the global scale in the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden since 1972. This 
conference led to the establishment of a series of principles and recommendations in an effort to 
promote development while keeping environmental issues in mind [United Nations, 1973:3]. In 
1987, the concept was officially recognized in the Brundtland Report3  defining sustainable 
development as the development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” [WCED, 1987:8]. In 1992, the Brundtland 
model of sustainable development was internationally endorsed at the Rio Earth Summit (UN 
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), adopting the 
principles and the agenda 21 for sustainable development. Since then, the concept has become 
one of the guiding principles in international politics. Although the term sustainable development 
has been criticized as ambiguous and inconsistent in its use [Baker et al, 1997:5; Sachs, 1999:25], 
it is internationally recognized that the concept intends to integrate environmental considerations 
into socio-economic development programs [Baker, 2006:7]. 
Recently, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have been set up as part of the 
post-2015 development agenda [The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda, 2013:1-6], containing 17 goals and 169 targets. Although it is 
argued that the implementation of sustainable development might be difficult because of its broad 
scope, the flexibility of its principles and objectives facilitate adaptation of the concept according 
to the stakeholders’ purposes and interests [Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 2000:14; Drexhage and 
Murphy, 2010:9]. Moreover, the multiple goals and targets enable governments and NGOs to 
combine tasks instead of focusing on one particular objective. 
Literally, sustainable development simply refers to the development that continues over 
time [Elliot, 2006:9; Lélé, 1991:608-609]. However, this new paradigm entails an integrated view 
of development in which not merely a long term economic output is to be attained, but also other 
aspects such as social and ecological components are important. The conventional idea of 
development dates back to the postwar initiatives in restoring devastated economies and assisting 
                                                   
1 In issues related to overpopulation and agricultural production limits. 
2 The reunion of the Club of Rome to address the problems of the human kind including the natural resources and 
pollution issues. 
3 Brundtland Report refers to the outcome document ‘Our Common Future’ of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development headed by the then Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland. 
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poor former colonies and agricultural countries through infrastructure projects [Sachs, 1999:28; 
Ostrom et al., 1993:1-3]. Initially, development was equated with economic growth that would 
percolate into social basic needs [Sachs, 1999:28]. However, this neoclassical focus had adverse 
consequences on the environment and society, including air pollution, overexploitation of natural 
resources, higher unemployment, and social inequalities [Salim, 2007:25-26]. Then, the 
international community took the initiative to formulate the strategies addressing environmental 
and social problems. 
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in its seminal work, 
Our Common Future emphasizes the need to limit the use of environmental resources. It also 
focuses on social equality, such that the natural resources are accessible to everyone, including 
the impoverished people, being a duty and responsibility of political authorities to empower 
citizens in decision makings [WCED, 1987:8-9]. Therefore, sustainable development has become 
an international commitment, and governments are bound to establish a participatory program 
that helps to limit the realm of bureaucracy and authoritarian solution. 
Lélé points out that initially, the concept of sustainability was used in relation to the 
renewable resource systems [Lélé, 1991:609]. In fisheries, the concept of sustainable yield (the 
annual catch level that can be maintained over the years) emerged to sustain fish harvests into the 
future, focusing primarily on the physical output, such as the amount landed for consumption 
[Charles, 2001:185]. Lélé contends that from that concept, the term ecological sustainability was 
derived. Ecological sustainability depends on the interaction between nature and the humans. The 
depletion of fish resources, for instance, may, on one hand, undermine the livelihood of fishing 
communities, but on the other hand, the depletion may occur due to the lack of knowledge or 
capabilities of fishers to conserve those resource units for future utilization [Lélé, 1991:609]. Thus, 
from her argument, it can be assumed that because of the crucial role of natural environment in 
people’s livelihood, the society must find a means to achieve sustainable development by using 
the resources rationally. 
 
Prospects of the commons 
The report Our Common Future prepared by the WCED introduced an outline on how to address 
the challenges of sustainable development in several fields, including the global commons. Albeit 
it focused on the management of oceans resource systems, the Commission underscored the 
importance of enhancing the cooperation and agreements among the different states to work on 
management, development, and monitoring of the shared ecosystems and commons. It also 
stressed that states must jointly devise equitable and enforceable rules to govern the commons 
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based on the rights and duties of their countries so as to prevent environmental degradation for 
future generations [WCED, 1987:261]. However, these political proposals must be implied as per 
the needs of each country, including the states and the civil societies.  
Ostrom quoted that William Clark stated that there was no improvement in programs 
intended to promote sustainable development, but the concept of sustainability has percolated into 
the development thinking within the international community. Moreover, she argued that the 
evaluations made by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) for 2001-2005 in terms of 
the ecosystem and its services in the world, indicated that while the economy grew substantially, 
there was a negative effect on the environment. In this regard, she stated that most of the problems 
related to the commons arise from the premise that standardized models lead to effective solutions. 
Generally, these standardized models are adopted by the central authorities without considering 
other local partners to govern the resource systems. Further, she stressed that environmental 
policies must be in accordance with the local cultures and institutions and that the performance 
should be monitored by governmental agencies and local users for sustainable use of common 
resources [Ostrom, 2008:10-11;17-18]. 
In the context of fisheries, the area of interest in this research, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) defines sustainable development as the “management 
and conservation of the natural resource base, and the orientation of technological and 
institutional change in such a manner as to ensure the attainment of continued satisfaction of 
human needs for present and future generations. Such sustainable development (in the agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries sectors) conserves land, water, plant and animal genetic resources, is 
environmentally non-degrading, technically appropriate, economically viable and socially 
acceptable.” [FAO, 1989:65]. This definition involves the use of a scarce resource base through 
institutional systems to continuously fulfill human needs. After the adoption of this definition, in 
1995, FAO published the “Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries” [FAO, 1995a] providing 
a series of principles to ensure a sustainable exploitation of the living aquatic resources. 
Conservation is a broad concept used in several fields. In the area of natural resources, 
it is conceived not only as a protection or preservation, but also as a wise use or resource 
management [Tivy and O’Hare, 1981:190,196]. With respect to the latter, in relation to 
development, Sachs refers to conservation as “the efficient management of natural resources in 
order to optimize the yield of living resources, such as forests or fish stocks, by harvesting just as 
much as not to impair the rate of regeneration” [Sachs, 1997:72]. Because management and 
conservation involve the wise use of resources, the role of institutions is crucial to constraint the 
use promoting cooperation and coordination, which can lower monitoring, sanctioning, and 
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enforcement costs. As Ostrom contended, agreed upon rules devised by groups of individuals, 
sharing similar values, can be effective in sustaining the resource system in the long term [Ostrom, 
1990]. In fisheries, the quantification of movable and migratory fish resources is difficult, 
particularly in countries lacking appropriate technologies and equipment for measurement. This 
study intends to examine resource management and conservation patterns in local settings, 
keeping in mind the backgrounds of fishing communities. 
Dialogue and participation of local stakeholders in decision makings can prevent further 
conflicts and project pitfalls. Berkes and Farvar suggested that the development planners 
interested in exploiting the resources of a particular area should know how to deal with the 
existing social structures. For instance, they exemplified that a Japanese fishery resource system 
such as iriai may not be suitable to be introduced and implemented on coastal fisheries area of 
Thailand, though some fishing practices may be applied [Berkes and Farvar, 1989:13-14]. Future-
oriented sustainable development programs should be held in congruence with local needs. 
 
Purpose of the research 
 
The present study aims to determine how management and conservation of inland fisheries can 
be sustained over time. It adopts an institutional approach in examining the governance of 
resource systems and its effects on local fisheries. As Berkes and Farvar have explained, the 
management of resource systems can function effectively as long as there exist institutions 
consistent with local and environmental settings [Berkes and Farvar, 1989:13]. That is, the 
institutions that can induce and motivate the actors to cooperate towards the rational use of 
common resources so that they are available or produced in the long term. 
This study is focused on inland recreational fisheries management in Argentina and the 
institutions governing the common-pool resources (CPRs). It analyzes how the central 
government and local fisheries stakeholders interact and coordinate in conserving the resources 
and identifies the factors that contribute to achieve the sustainable development of inland fisheries. 
It also includes a comparative analysis of inland recreational and commercial fishing in two 
regions of the country. The role of the government is fundamental in defining the regulations to 
avoid overuse, depletion, and conflicts, but it must be backed by the local stakeholders. Therefore, 
this study assesses how the collaboration management can effectively function to sustainably 
conserve the fish resources.  
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Methodology of the research 
 
In fisheries, the users interact with CPRs. Thus, the human actions and resource management 
determine how to conserve the available resources in the long term. To avoid overuse, there is a 
need to establish institutions that must be effective and consistent with the local needs and the 
environmental settings [Berkes and Farvar, 1989:13]. 
 An important theoretical framework of institutions has been proposed by the late 
economist Douglas North, who analyzed transaction costs and enforcement processes in 
examining the relationship between institutions and the economic development. He suggested that 
institutions “are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” and “reduce 
uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life” [North 1990:3-4]. North explained that 
institutions consist of formal and informal constraints, and the first can complement the second, 
and lower transaction costs [North, 1991:46]. Therefore, his assumption establishes that the 
institutions can create order and incentives, and reduce uncertainties in human interactions.  
Elinor Ostrom, a political scientist, who studied the implications of institutions in the 
management of CPRs in local and regional settings, stated that institutions are the set of working 
rules used to organize repetitive interactions [Ostrom 1990:51; Ostrom 1992; Ostrom 2005:3]. 
From the analysis of several case studies, she found that a group of individuals sharing common 
values can self-organize and devise their own rules to govern the commons for a long period of 
time. However, Ostrom argued that when governmental authorities give some rights to local users 
to organize and make decisions on resource use, the CPRs and the institutions tend to endure over 
the years [Ostrom 1990]. Furthermore, Ostrom et al. pointed out that the government agencies 
can act as a facilitator by providing locally non-available information and helping to enforce 
commitments [Ostrom et al. 1999:281]. In this dissertation, earlier concepts of sustainable 
development were outlined.   
 The present study was based on the theoretical postures of North and Ostrom. In 
particular, it uses the institutional approach of Ostrom as a reference in examining several case 
studies to identify the inland fisheries management and conservation regimes that have been 
successful or failed to function over the years. This study analyzed how the sets of rules have 
been crafted to organize fishing activities on the local and regional basis. The degree of 
governmental intervention in the management and enforcement systems and the participation of 
the users in decision makings were also examined to determine the role of national authorities. In 
this way, we can understand how coordination and cooperation or their absence affected the 
management and conservation of CPRs in Argentina.  
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Empirically, the management and institutional framework of inland recreational and 
commercial fisheries of two regions of Argentina were examined (Figure 1). The first was the 
Patagonia region located in the southern area, and the second was the Pampas region covering the 
central eastern part of the country. We studied how the inland recreational fishing rules have been 
devised in both the regions and analyzed the current fisheries management regimes.  
 
Figure 1. Case Studies 
 
The Patagonia region includes the case study of the Río Negro Province, to assess how 
the central and local governments, as well as social groups of different backgrounds, have 
managed the inland recreational fisheries to conserve the salmonids species. It involved a non-
profit recreational fishery organization, located in the Bariloche Department, to apply the theory 
of Ostrom et al. (1999) with respect to the role of the government. Then, the inland artisanal 
commercial fishing on Pellegrini Lake, located in General Roca Department was examined as a 
comparative case.  
For the Pampas region, the case of inland recreational and artisanal commercial fishing 
of native pejerrey species, which predominate in the shallow lakes of Buenos Aires Province, was 
studied. Furthermore, the unique history of inland artisanal commercial fisheries of the Las Tunas 
Shallow Lake complex, located in Trenque Lauquen Department, was examined. Inland 
recreational angling of Laguna Gómez Shallow Lake, located in Junín Department was also 
studied as an area recovering from depletion.  
The author conducted a survey in Laguna Gómez Shallow Lake, during the pejerrey 
fishing season on June 5 and 6, 2016. Targets were anglers from 15 to over 70 years old who were 
fishing from the shore or boats. The survey collected information on the characteristics of the 
local anglers, the informal and voluntary conservation measures, and their prospects for 
recreational fishing in the future. Moreover, it identified the current concerns of the local anglers 
with respect to recreational fishing. A survey of users of the Patagonian inland waters was also 
conducted to make a comparative analysis of the characteristic of anglers and voluntary 
 
 
 
 
Río Negro Province       Buenos Aires Province 
Patagonia Region Pampas Region 
Bariloche Pellegrini Lake Junín Las Tunas Complex 
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conservation practices. 
Data on the current situation of the inland recreational and artisanal commercial 
fisheries of both regions were collected from previous scientific literature and official documents, 
and through fieldworks. We interviewed anglers, local artisanal fishermen, owners of fishing 
establishments, academics, public officials, and representatives of non-government organizations 
so as to verify their perceptions and opinions about the inland fisheries management in Argentina.  
 
Definitions 
 
This section explains the main definitions used in this study. The term institutions refer to a set of 
rules that constrain human behavior in a certain situation [North, 1990:3-4; Ostrom, 1990:51]. It 
adopts the notions established by North in formal and informal constrains, and Ostrom on 
governing the common-pool resources (CPRs). Keeping in mind the definitions of the WCED 
(1987) and FAO (1989), Sustainable Development alludes to the use of resources over time 
through cooperation and coordination mechanisms. Natural resource management is defined in 
this study as the sustainable utilization of fisheries resources that generate goods and services to 
support human activities [World Bank, 2000:3]. Inland fisheries refer to “any activity conducted 
to extract fish and other aquatic organisms from inland waters [FAO, 1997:4]. 
 The term common-pool resources (CPRs) indicates the resource systems, such as fishing 
grounds that are capable of producing a flow of stocks of resource units [Ostrom, 1990:30]. 
Common-property resources that have similar connotations are used depending on the context. 
Anglers refer to those individuals that use a line, rod, and hook for fishing, and fishers to those 
who use conventional fishing methods and non-conventional ones, such as gill nets and cast nets. 
Even though in Argentina the term sport fishing is frequently used, this study employed 
recreational fishing or angling, which includes sport fishing for competition. Recreational fishing 
is defined as fishing for leisure or pastime [Wegrzyn and Ortubay, 2009:301-302; Mancini and 
Grosman, 2008:30-31]. Co-management or Collaboration management refers to “regimes in 
which government and users have shared power and responsibility in enhancement or long-range 
stock recovery planning and habitat protection [Pinkerton, 1989:12]”. That is, the partnership 
arrangement between the governments and local stakeholders in fisheries decision making to 
conserve the resources over time.  
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Chapter structure of the thesis  
 
The present study is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1, presents the theoretical framework of 
this study. It reviews the theory of transaction costs and institutions developed by Douglas North 
as well as the sociological approach to institutions. We believe that the characteristics of formal 
and informal constraints outlined by North and their effects on socio-economic development are 
relevant to our research. The views of Ostrom on institutions are also reviewed: she stated that 
institutions are a set of rules that limit human behavior in certain situations. It is argued that 
institutions are crucial to organizing activities within a community by giving some autonomy to 
local users to manage the resources. Chapter 2 examines Ostrom’s theory of CPRs, contending 
that groups of individuals can develop rules to manage the resource system. In terms of fisheries, 
the evolution of fisheries management is presented, and the frame for comparative analysis of 
commercial and recreational fishing is outlined. Our hypothesis is that recreational fishing has the 
potential to reconcile exploitation and conservation of resources.  
 Chapter 3 outlines the fisheries situation and the institutional framework for fisheries 
management in Argentina. It also presents an overview of angling in the Patagonia region, 
describing the rules devised by member provinces and the process of building uniform and 
standardized inland recreational fishing regulations. We quote the framework of Ostrom in 
analyzing the use of CPRs, which reflects the collective action process in the Patagonian region. 
Then, regulations imposed in Buenos Aires have been examined, because member provinces of 
the Pampas region have not established a common fishing rule. The author intends to deduce how 
the Patagonia region has successfully implemented the inland fisheries regulations, whereas the 
Pampas region is still struggling to decentralize its fisheries management. 
 Chapter 4 and 5 are the main sections of our study. Both sections present the data 
collected onsite and examine the trends and issues related to recreational fishing management in 
Buenos Aires and Río Negro Province. They look over the fishing licenses issued to estimate the 
numbers of recreational fishers and the restocking programs held in both provinces, which we 
believe will to affect the fish population. On the other hand, we review the inland artisanal 
commercial fishing practiced in two different communities located close to Pellegrini Lake, Río 
Negro Province and Las Tunas Shallow Lake complex of Buenos Aires Province. Although the 
first failed in sustaining cooperation among local fishers, the second has successfully achieved 
with self-organize and devise operating rules for over 30 years. Differences in local users’ 
interactions were observed. Furthermore, surveys conducted with anglers at the Laguna Gómez 
Shallow Lake and those using Patagonian inland waters were analyzed to evaluate anglers’ 
characteristics and voluntary habits in conserving resources. The survey found some similarities 
among anglers on conservation concerns as well as differences in preferences and socio-economic 
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conditions. 
Collective action, cooperation, and collaboration management have functioned 
relatively well in the Patagonia region, and the consultation probably facilitated the use of 
common rules over time. Even though inland recreational fisheries management has been 
sustained in the region, certain shortcomings in the governance of inland artisanal commercial 
fisheries are found, such as rivalries among local users. In the Pampas region, particularly in the 
Buenos Aires Province, central authorities have managed inland recreational and commercial 
fisheries, and yet illegal practices persist. However, recreational anglers have adopted several 
types of informal voluntary conservation measures, and some artisanal commercial fishers have 
self-organized to sustain fishing activities.  
This research concludes in Chapter 6, which argues the policy implications of inland 
fisheries management based on the results found in the four case studies. It is surmised that the 
consultation process can be a condition to create rules congruent to users’ needs, which requires 
cooperation and coordination among stakeholders. It discusses the role of the government in 
sustaining the use of resources over time, using the argument of Ostrom in regards to the 
governance of CPRs. Finally, the author intends to answer the research question from an 
institutional perspective to manage the commons resources in the long term.  
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単行本もしくは雑誌掲載等の形で刊行される予定であるため、下記の部分を除外する。 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
Institutional approach to govern the commons 
 
Commercial and recreational fisheries involve both users and common-pool resources (CPRs). 
To conserve the fish population over time, management is crucial to constrain such use. In 
comparison with commercial fishing, recreational fishing has the potential to reconcile utilization 
and conservation of living aquatic resources. For this purpose, sustainable management can 
function effectively as long as there exist institutions consistent with local needs and 
environmental circumstances.  
 Theoretically, the term “institution” has several connotations. We have chosen the 
theoretical approaches of Douglas North and Elinor Ostrom to study the management of inland 
recreational fishing in Argentina. North defined institutions as rules of the game that shape human 
interactions in a society to reduce uncertainties, and they consist of formal rules, informal 
constraints, and their enforcement mechanisms. Ostrom, in turn, argued that formal laws can be 
converted into rules as long as individuals understand them and perceive that infraction entails 
sanction and punishment. Thus, she stated that groups of individuals sharing CPRs can create 
certain rules to build order and expectations in an action situation. That is, groups managing a 
resource system can self-organize to devise rules and enforcement mechanisms through 
communication and cooperation. However, she contended that rules can be sustained when the 
central government gives some autonomy to local groups to organize and make decisions on 
resource use, and it acts as a facilitator to arrange meetings or provide information to solve a 
problem in a local field setting.  
Fisheries involve CPRs, so they face common physical dilemmas of subtractability and 
non-excludability. Hence, properly devised management regimes and conservation incentives are 
needed to prevent overuse of the resource system. Institutions for CPR management can be formal 
or informal. “Formal” institutions are regulations imposed by centralized government agencies, 
and “informal” institutions are constraints or customary habits usually based on procedures 
determined by individuals and local community groups. In recreational fishing, voluntary rules 
can also help to conserve the resources and anglers may contribute to conservation of fish 
resources through their involvement in the development of fishing regulations. 
 
Management of recreational fisheries and the role of institutions 
 
The management of recreational fisheries consists of the establishment of fishing regulations, 
restocking programs, and habitat manipulation. In Argentina, the dominant inland fisheries 
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management systems include regulations and restocking of native and exotic species. Provincial 
central governments manage and design both fishing regulations and restocking programs. 
However, member provinces of the Patagonia region and the National Parks Administration have 
managed to build a unified inland recreational fishing regulation that is mostly congruent with 
local needs. The initial involvement and advice of users may have been key factors that facilitated 
such achievement. Currently, technical advisors, academics, anglers, and private sectors are 
invited to participate in annual provincial consultation meetings to discuss issues concerning local 
fishing. In these meetings, information and suggestions are collected, and depending on their 
relevance, proposals are eventually presented to governmental authorities. The involvement and 
participation of users in developing rules and conservation programs can improve management 
goals, as shown by the case of Patagonia’s inland recreational fishing. 
Conversely, the Pampas region has not been able to create unified recreational fishing 
regulations (Figure 27). This can be attributed to the lack of interest of the region’s member 
provinces in building standardized regulations. Administratively, the Buenos Aires Province, 
which covers almost the entire region, enforces its own fishing regulations. Moreover, Buenos 
Aires provides a wide choice of outdoor activities other than recreational fishing, and so the 
government may have disregarded the potential impact of fishing on the tourism industry and 
local economy [Grosman, 2001]. In contrast, the Patagonia region, located in the southern part of 
the country, is suitable for the habitat of salmonids and has been an ideal recreational fishing 
destination, thus becoming an important source of income for the region [Wegrzyn and Ortubay 
2009:298]. The natural environment has enabled the restocking of exotic species to promote 
tourism at the local, regional, and international levels.  
 
Figure 27. System of Recreational Fisheries 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 We observed that institutions developed through mutual agreement and cooperation 
have been internalized in Patagonia. Overall, the unified inland fishing rules have created order 
and expectations regarding the use of water resources in the long term. The rules that Ostrom 
identified can be applied to the case of Patagonia. The position rules authorize the member 
provinces of Chubut, Neuquén, Río Negro, Santa Cruz, and Tierra del Fuego, as well as the 
National Parks Administration as entities with the power to determine the restrictions, and the 
System of Recreational Fisheries in Argentina 
Pampas region              Patagonia region 
↓                       ↓ 
No regional inland fishing license system    Regional inland fishing license system 
 
 
109 
 
boundary rules define how to enter or leave the position. Initially, Neuquén and the National Parks 
Administration developed the unified inland recreational fishing regulations, and then other 
provinces joined the inter-jurisdictional agreement. The authority rules determine the restrictions 
or actions that are permitted, required, or prohibited, such as the definition of fishing areas, 
angling methods, and gear types. The aggregation rules are defined annually through consultation 
about the changes in operational rules. The scope rules include the fishing procedures to be 
followed. The information rules refer to the provision of information such as regarding closed 
season, bag limits, and precautions. Finally, the payoff rules refer to payoffs assigned to anglers 
and other stakeholders as well as revenue obtained from license sales supposedly being used for 
the conservation of salmonid species. These clearly defined rules coupled with enforcement 
mechanisms can explain the sustainable development of inland recreational fisheries in the 
Patagonia region. 
 Ostrom’s theory argues that groups of individuals can devise an efficient set of rules to 
organize repetitive interactions, which is supported by the case study of the Patagonia region. 
However, her statement that the centrally governed system can create local resistance does not 
apply to this region. The government’s role in consolidating the inland recreational fishing 
regulations has been important, although the initial active participation and collaboration of direct 
users in defining the institutions may be the critical step in assuring congruence between the rules 
and stakeholders’ interests. Moreover, each province has the task of monitoring and enforcing the 
regulations in accordance with its own internal rules. Free riders or illegal fishing has not 
disappeared, but it appears that fish rangers trained by provinces are struggling to control fishing 
sites in cooperation with local police and gendarmerie officials. 
Even though the Pampas region has not consolidated their unified inland recreational 
fishing regulations, the Buenos Aires Province established an alliance with local angling clubs 
and associations. For instance, government farming entities provide eggs and alevins of native 
pejerrey free of charge to fishing clubs and associations owning pisciculture facilities, and 
restocking programs are conducted with the assistance of government officials. These angling 
clubs and associations are members of fishing federations. However, although issues concerning 
recreational fishing are discussed in their meetings, activities are rather limited to organizing 
fishing tournaments. Therefore, these informal groups have not participated in developing fishing 
rules in Buenos Aires. Their active involvement could contribute to the improvement of the 
conservation of fish resources. 
Unlike the Patagonia provinces, there are many fishing clubs and associations in Buenos 
Aires. The population of Buenos Aires is much larger than the entire Patagonia region; its 
population including the metropolitan area is of 18.5 million, while the total population of the 
Patagonia region is 2.1 million [Instituto Geográfico Nacional, 2016]. Although the number of 
110 
 
fishing clubs and associations in Patagonia region is not significant, the region has been able to 
set agreed-upon rules, and inland recreational fishing has become one of the main drivers of its 
local economy. In Buenos Aires, the fisheries management regime has been centralized, and 
monitoring and enforcement systems have remained weak. The limited civil participation in 
decision making can be attributed to the government’s low interest in promoting this sector, given 
other investments opportunities. 
In relation to the role of governments, local governments in the Patagonia region have 
crafted a unified and common inland recreational fisheries system that is mostly congruent with 
the social and environmental settings. In the Pampas region, the fact that Buenos Aires occupies 
almost the entire region and has a larger population than Patagonia may have led each province 
to devise and use its own internal fishing regulations.  
  
Success and failure of inland fisheries  
 
Inland recreational fisheries in Río Negro have functioned under the co-management regime, 
while fishing activities in Buenos Aires have been regulated by governmental legislation. The 
operation of inland artisanal commercial fishing in Río Negro has been managed and controlled 
under the umbrella of the central government. There is little participation of local users in the 
decision-making process. However, in Buenos Aires, groups of fishermen have developed their 
own rules through community-based organization while disregarding formal laws (see Table 8).  
 
Table 8: Status of Fisheries by Region and Area  
Region Province Type of 
fishing 
Status Variable 
 
Patagonia 
 
Río Negro: San 
Carlos de 
Bariloche area 
 
Recreational 
 
Sustainable 
Collaborative 
management 
Río Negro: 
Pellegrini Lake 
Commercial Unsustainable Centralized 
management 
 
 
 
Pampas 
 
Buenos Aires:  
Gómez Shallow Lake 
 
Recreational 
 
Recovering 
Centralized 
management and 
favorable water 
conditions 
Buenos Aires: 
Las Tunas Shallow 
Lake 
 
Commercial 
 
Sustainable 
 
Self-organized group 
 
Inland fisheries in Río Negro Province 
The case study of Río Negro in chapter 5 demonstrates that inland recreational fishing has been 
organized through cooperation and coordination between governmental and non-governmental 
organizations. Artisanal commercial fishers could not establish unified organizations (such as 
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cooperatives) to manage fishing. Although there was an initial attempt to operate cooperatively, 
fishermen have gradually taken an individualistic and competitive posture in terms of resource 
sharing, due to the disregard of users’ needs by government agencies and local circumstances. 
 In this particular case of artisanal commercial fishing, as Ostrom pointed out, strong 
government intervention in resource management tends to affect the governance of CPRs. The 
government, by giving some rights to local users to organize their activities and acting as 
facilitators in problem solving can lead to sustainable use of resources. However, as Ostrom and 
her scholars’ state, when the government controls the use of resources and sets rules that neglect 
local and environmental settings, the intervention can, at times, undermine local resource 
management.  
The Honorary Directive Desk of Recreational Fisheries of Zona Andina, composed of 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, academics, and local tourism entities, has 
sustained its activities since 2001. Although the government has an important role as a member 
of this entity, it appears that its participation has been minimal, having delegated to other actors 
the rights to manage internal operations, particularly as regards control and inspection activities, 
and acting sometimes as a facilitator in problem solving. We argue that the Recreational Fisheries 
Desk could self-organize and manage inland recreational fishing over time through cooperation 
and coordination among member parties and the government. The constitutional choice action 
led to the organization of the collective choice action, and the latter determined the operational 
rules, a virtuous process in favor of sustainable fishing. 
 Conversely, the artisanal commercial fishing conducted in Pellegrini Lake presents a 
contrasting situation. The provincial government has the authority to issue fishing licenses to 
artisanal fishermen, and it controls and monitors the fish resources of the lake. Only six fishermen 
are entitled to use and commercialize the captures. Fish landing is controlled in a small filleting 
plant owned by a private owner. According to an agreement, local fishermen can use the facility 
to process their captures. The owner, in turn, sells their processed products to local markets and 
pays a determined fee to each fisher. However, conflicts arise with regards to payments, probably 
owing to the absence of a local agency to address the concerns of local fishermen as well as to 
the neglect of the central provincial government toward local fishing operations. Conflicts among 
fishers and uncontrolled use of resources persist. What is worse, fishers cannot act in a uniform 
manner due to internal distrust. All these factors can result in the overuse of resources. In the case 
of Pellegrini Lake, although the provincial central government has imposed rules, it appears that 
the monitoring and controlling systems are not operated properly. Decentralization can help to re-
organize the inland fishing systems. 
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Inland fisheries in Buenos Aires Province 
Inland fisheries have been basically managed by the provincial central government. The 
government has devised the institutions and allocated use rights of the inland CPRs. In contrast 
with Río Negro, because of the presence of large numbers of fishing clubs and associations, the 
province has several fishing federations. However, cooperative activities between these 
organizations and the government have been sporadic. Fishing federations have been mainly 
engaged in organizing recreational fishing tournaments, with no participation in decision making 
about fisheries. In terms of inland artisanal commercial fishing, although licenses were provided 
to local fishermen decades ago on a cooperative basis, commercial capture was forbidden in all 
shallow lakes of Buenos Aires Province until 2016. 
 Inland recreational fishing is regulated under the stipulations specified in the 
“Reglamento de Pesca Deportiva” (Recreational Fisheries Regulations) issued by the government 
of Buenos Aires. However, little is known about the regulations and, both control and monitoring 
have been perceived as inefficient. The survey conducted in Laguna Gómez Shallow Lake, Junín, 
revealed that of the 82 surveyed anglers, only 21% responded that held a proper license. 
Presumably, there was no license control or monitoring of captures. Moreover, although 73% of 
the total respondents agree with the stipulations imposed by the government, some ignore the 
regulations about exceeding capture limits. However, in terms of resource conservation, most 
anglers (67%) adopt certain voluntary preservation measures indicating that they are not 
unconcerned about resource conservation. Therefore, the situation in Junín is characterized by the 
presence of voluntary informal institutions in recreational fishing activities. 
 The informal rules or habits include the release of small and uninjured pieces of pejerrey 
species back to the water, participation in keeping the fishing site clean and taking home the 
garbage, and transmitting the implications of conservation to the next generation. Certain areas 
of Laguna Gómez Shallow Lake have been polluted, but this may be attributed to the lack of 
garbage containers at sites where anglers concentrate. We also observed that small pieces of 
pejerrey species were discarded on the ground. Hence, there is still a need to formulate policies 
to educate anglers about the sustainable use of resources and improve the conservation efforts. 
The problem of subtractability and non-exludability exits in the shallow lakes of Buenos 
Aires. In Laguna Gómez Shallow Lake, even though most anglers release the captured fish units, 
some overfish the pejerrey resources. However, fishing activities are recovering due to favorable 
water conditions, interest in developing activities at the shallow lakes, and good availability of 
seeds and juveniles for restocking programs.  
 Furtive fishing predominates in Buenos Aires, which has been one of the most relevant 
concerns for the government and fishers. Control and monitoring have been difficult due to 
several reasons, including lack of personnel, vast area of the region, and large number of water 
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bodies. Artisanal commercial fisheries in shallow lakes of Buenos Aires were held under the 
control of the government [Alvarez and Zingoni, 2001:148]; particularly Las Tunas Shallow Lake 
was one water body that produced pejerrey species for human consumption. Even though fish 
landings were prohibited until 2016, fishermen of Beruti Village continued exploiting the fishing 
ground. They became self-organized and devised the fishing operational (time, space, and 
technology) and monitoring rules over the past 30 years. These informal groups have also created 
a chain to trade the captures through coordination and cooperation. In 2015, 40 families were 
engaged in pejerrey fishing, and processing techniques have been transmitted through generations. 
Fishermen using the resource system have revealed that landings were sustainable over the years, 
suggesting that even without the intervention of the government, they successfully managed the 
CPRs. Las Tunas complex has been occupied solely by this closed community that restricts access 
to outsiders and respects the closing season rules. In 2016, after more than a decade, the 
government has authorized the practice of artisanal commercial fishing in Las Tunas complex. 
This history implies that a community locally devising and managing institutions can use an 
enduring resource system.  
 
Factors affecting management of inland fisheries from an institutional perspective 
 
We have argued that inland commercial and recreational fisheries management systems have had 
differing results from an institutional point of view and that within the same province two fishing 
regimes exist, the central and co-management patterns. Collective action and cooperation have 
prevailed in the Patagonia region and Río Negro Province. However, these components have led 
to the organization of only recreational fishing activities. This may be because recreational fishing 
became a key driver for local economic development, and conservation of fish fauna was a priority. 
Regional governments have gathered and integrated local stakeholders for the consultation 
process to develop the inland recreational fishing rules. The consultation process and participation 
of local users in the discussions may have helped create this enduring fishing regulation system 
in Patagonia. Holding a proper license has been internalized as a habit by most inland water 
anglers. Several conditions explain this achievement. For instance, in Bariloche city, permits are 
accessible to the public, some of which can be obtained at local fishing gear and tackle stores or 
gas stations; most fishing guides are licensed professionals; shared patrolling services exist; and 
local stakeholders promote programs for resource conservation.  
Co-management is practiced in some regions. A clear example is the stakeholders’ 
partnership represented by the Honorary Directive Desk of Recreational Fisheries (Zona Andina) 
in Río Negro that has crafted internal rules to conduct recreational fishing activities over the years. 
Although the coordinator in charge of managing the organization is a central government envoy, 
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the entity has certain autonomy to organize its activities collaboratively. For instance, members 
have agreed to build a mechanism to expand the education about conservation of fish resources 
and distribution of recreational fishing licenses in elementary schools of remote rural areas in 
Bariloche Department, although budgetary constraints and the need to train central officials in 
fishing activities remain to be addressed.  
 The top-down approach prevails in Buenos Aires, where monitoring and enforcement 
remain weak. In terms of fishing regulations, most local anglers do not hold a proper license as 
demonstrated by the survey held in Laguna Gómez Shallow Lake. Furthermore, collective action 
and cooperation among users or stakeholders have been minimal. Collaboration between the 
public and private sectors exist in fishing tournaments activities; the government monitors and 
controls catches and promotes events, while the private sector such as angling entities arranges 
the competitions. However, local users do not participate in developing fishing regulations. 
Moreover, it seems that the province is not yet prepared to manage recreational fisheries since 
licenses are not accessible at the local level, and training courses for fishing guides are not 
provided in the province. The existence of large number of users with differing interests may have 
impeded the collaboration, which is in contrast with the case of Patagonia.  
With respect to restocking programs, even though the management has taken place 
under government supervision, its performance differs between the two regions. The data 
presented in chapters 4 and 5 indicate that while production and distribution of pejerrey resources 
for restocking increased in Buenos Aires, releasing programs decreased in Patagonia. It seems 
that the government of Buenos Aires has worked actively to promote pejerrey culture by acquiring 
technologies from Japan. In Patagonia, experts from Japan have shared salmonid farming 
techniques, but restocking activities may not have been as active as in Buenos Aires. The 
difference could be attributed to two environmental factors. First, in Buenos Aires, the cultured 
and restocked species is a native one, while Patagonia has historically introduced exotic species, 
which is considered a threat to the natural habitat. Second, the shallow lakes of Buenos Aires are 
vulnerable to climate changes, such as floods and draughts, which often make it necessary to 
restore the water environment. In Patagonia, the glacier lakes, rivers, and streams shared with 
neighboring provinces make the exotic species flow into other jurisdictional areas, which can 
perturb the local aquatic ecosystem.  
Inland artisanal commercial fisheries in both regions present a peculiar situation. In 
Lake Pellegrini (Río Negro), although catches are operated by authorized fishermen (six in total) 
and landings are officially controlled, it was noted that the local fishing community has the stance 
of competition and rivalry, and hence cooperation does not exist. The difficulty of profit sharing 
may be the factor generating internal conflicts, which induces clandestine fishing. Moreover, not 
only low control but also inconsistent restrictions facilitate such behavior. Central provincial 
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governments should reformulate the management regime and open a space at the community level 
to improve the situation. 
 The situation of inland commercial fishing in Las Tunas complex was the opposite. 
Local fishers, at the time of the interview (2015), were harvesting pejerrey units without 
authorization. These fishermen who were former agricultural farmers that had to change their 
usual work for their livelihood, have self-organized and created their own rules to use the resource 
system of Las Tunas Shallow Lake. The absence of governmental intervention on resource use 
may have led to the creation of an internal rule to sustain fishing activity within the community.  
Recent actions taken by the new provincial government in Buenos Aires can be 
considered logical in this regard. In 2016, the new administration, jointly with the local 
government, authorized the harvest of pejerrey species in Las Tunas Shallow Lake to legitimize 
the position of fishermen and help them sustain their living. However, central and local authorities 
state that cooperation and communication between the parties are crucial to achieve sustainable 
development of inland fisheries in the region. Moreover, since monitoring and enforcement are 
important factors for governing CPRs, the government has announced its commitment to 
reinforce the system. The central authority of Río Negro Province should also convert the 
clandestine fishing practices into legal activities to meet the needs of local resource users. 
 In terms of the level of compliance with centrally governed regulations, even though 
local commercial fishers in Lake Pellegrini are authorized users and report their volume of 
landings, there is no cooperation among them and competition about the number of captures 
predominates. It seems that unequal returns hinder local fishing organizations. On the other hand, 
unauthorized users in Las Tunas Shallow Lake have been harvesting pejerrey over the years. 
There was no compliance with official regulations but a group of local fishers have settled on 
their own catching rules and coordinated their activities. The clearly defined income shares and 
social organization may have enabled the sustainable development of inland pejerrey fishing in 
this region. 
  
Empirical research findings and their political implications 
 
The purpose of this research is to determine how management and conservation of inland fisheries 
can be sustained in Argentina over time, adopting an institutional approach on the governance of 
resource systems. The government’s role is crucial in organizing the use of water resources, but 
the involvement and participation of all concerned groups in decision making is also important to 
conserve the resources in the long term. 
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 Cooperation between stakeholders can help create fisheries regulations that are mostly 
concordant to users’ needs. Provincial member governments and the National Parks 
Administration have devised institutions governing inland recreational fisheries of the Patagonia 
region. However, prior to the establishment of fishing operational rules, consultation meetings 
have been held in some provinces, in which local recreational fishing stakeholders participated in 
discussions. In general, inland recreational fisheries are well organized in the sense that holding 
a proper license has become internalized for most anglers. On the other hand, groups of 
individuals can self-organize and devise their own rules as long as local rights are recognized to 
conserve the resources, such as the control and inspection activities held by the Honorary 
Directive Desk of Recreational Fisheries in the Río Negro Province. When the government 
intervenes as the ultimate authority to manage resources and impose rules without consultation, 
conflicts over the use of resources and clandestine catches and smuggling can emerge, as in the 
case of artisanal commercial fishing in Lake Pellegrini. 
 The fisheries case studies of Buenos Aires have demonstrated that even though 
governmental fishing regulations are in force, they can, at times, be disregarded by users due to 
weak control, monitoring, and enforcement systems. One consequence of this is furtive fishing 
and overuse of resources in some places. However, both inland artisanal commercial and 
recreational fishing have self-managed the fisheries without strong intervention from the 
government. Sustainable development of fisheries can be achieved through collaborative 
management by incorporating locally devised institutions. As Ostrom pointed out, the 
government can act as a facilitator in providing basic equipment and information and arbitrating 
internal agreements.  
 The survey also revealed that local anglers, who are mostly working class with basic 
formal education, are likely to engage in conservation programs. Recreational fishing is not only 
an important social activity but also a source of food. Despite their low income, the surveyed 
anglers showed their willingness to pay a minimum fee to improve the fish stock and quality of 
fishing activities. Moreover, this segment of the population adopts certain voluntary conservation 
measures of pejerrey resources. Recreational fishing is not only a traditional leisure activity for 
middle-class or wealthy population but also a valuable recreational activity for the low-income 
population having a sense of environmental ethics or long-term rationality. 
 According to the survey conducted with anglers at Laguna Gómez Shallow Lake and 
Patagonian inland waters, both adopt voluntary conservation measures such as the catch-and-
release method. In terms of occupation and formal education, anglers fishing in Patagonia’s inland 
waters are better positioned than those fishing in the inland waters of Buenos Aires. Additionally, 
all of them hold proper fishing licenses, but none consumes the captured species. Furthermore, 
they showed willingness to pay a fee to improve the quantity of salmonid and the overall quality 
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of fishing activities in the region. It seems that resource conservation concerns are similar for 
anglers of both the Patagonian and Pampas regions. 
 These empirical findings have political implications. From an institutional perspective, 
the centralized management approach as observed in Buenos Aires could probably be enhanced 
by changing or expanding the recreational fishing license system, especially as most anglers may 
not know of the existence of the system. Moreover, although capture sizes and quantities are 
established voluntarily, there is a need to develop a system to collect information on recreational 
fishing and build a development program to improve the current uncontrolled situation.  
The case of Patagonia showed that collective action and cooperation can generate 
effective results in terms of devising fishing regulations. In Buenos Aires, cooperation between 
governmental agencies and communities at the local level as well as inclusion of local 
stakeholders on consultations could be a way to enhance fishing activities. The consultation 
process used to organize inland fisheries of Patagonia indicates that the initial phase is critical to 
develop a long-enduring institution. The institutional approach utilized to examine the fishing 
activities in Argentina can be applied not only in the area of fisheries but also to other 
development and resource management fields.  
 On the other hand, both regions can complement each other in innovating management 
approaches. An example could be the democratization of fisheries management in Lake Pellegrini, 
similar to what happened in Las Tunas Shallow Lake, with the advent of the new government 
administration. In turn, cooperation between local governments and angling organizations 
(similar to the case in the Patagonia region) can create a collaborative mechanism for the fishing 
licensing system, for instance, by distributing licenses to fishing clubs or associations and using 
the collected funds to develop statistical data or formulate pilot projects. 
 Formulation of strategies intended to respond to local anglers’ needs such as improving 
the fishing facilities and quantity of fish stocks are necessary to sustain the activities. Moreover, 
since inland recreational fishing in Buenos Aires contributes to food security, limnological and 
ichthyological controls must be reinforced in collaboration with local and provincial 
governmental agencies. 
Local governmental offices such as municipalities can play a crucial role in collecting 
information about the resource system; conditions of the control and monitoring operations; and 
suggestions from fishers, fishing clubs or associations, private owners of fishing grounds, and 
local citizens. The information collected from direct and indirect users can be processed, analyzed, 
and evaluated at the local level and their concerns about the resource system communicated to 
the provincial central government. In order to respond to these concerns, the central authority, in 
coordination with the local government, can formulate strategies to address users’ needs and 
improve fishing conditions at the local level. In this way, a cooperative mechanism can be 
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established locally to solve conflicts or CPR problems (Figure 28). Decentralization and 
participation of users in resource management can contribute to conservation efforts. Since 
budgetary constraints are the most common factors that undermine project initiatives, alternatives 
such as the use of existing tourism or fisheries production offices within local government 
establishments can be of much help.  
 
Figure 28. Process to Solve CPR Problems 
  
Institutions and sustainable development: A human security approach 
As explained in the introduction, the concept of human security began to pervade internationally 
with the advent of new security threats affecting the core lives of human beings. Thus, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report underscored the need to tackle challenges of 
human security, including threats to hunger, health, and deterioration of local ecosystems. 
The growing demand for natural resources, including fisheries and its overexploitation, 
generate new challenges to human security. Development and exploitation of resources while 
neglecting environmental considerations leads to menace people’s livelihoods in the long run. 
The introduction of exotic Nile perch species into Lake Victoria is a known case of failure. Thus, 
creation of an adequate institutional structure is crucial to promote sustainable development. The 
management and conservation of natural resources consistent with local settings can mitigate the 
negative impacts on human security. Inland fisheries institutions can function effectively as long 
as cooperation and coordination prevail among stakeholders. Participation of direct users and 
local actors in decision making can improve social and conservation outcomes. Centralized 
institutions that neglect social and environmental needs are likely to fail, as has happened in the 
case of artisanal commercial fishing in the country.  
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Postscript: Toward a comparison with the case of Japan 
 
The role of fisheries and aquaculture in global food security and socio economic development has 
been recognized in many parts of the world. Prior to this research, the author examined 
aquaculture development and its implications in Latin American countries, exploring the 
successful case study of the Chilean salmon industry. In view of the fact that aquaculture programs 
have not prospered as expected in countries such as Argentina, the present research focused on 
the study of inland recreational and artisanal fisheries. This is because fish farming programs have 
contributed to the development of both types of fishing activities in that country.    
 To study the governance of inland fisheries in Argentina, an institutional approach was 
adopted using the theoretical framework of North and Ostrom for this research. Its aim was to 
examine how resource management and conservation can be sustained over time. Institutions are 
important elements to constrain the use of water resources and prevent overexploitation. However, 
the imposition of formal rules that are not congruent with users’ needs can, at times, hinder the 
local organization and degrade the resource system. In turn, when some rights are given to local 
stakeholders to organize the CPRs, institutions can endure over time. The case of Argentina 
showed that although the resource management system in some regions presented failures from 
an institutional perspective, other regions could devise sustainable fishing rules through 
cooperation and coordination among local stakeholders.   
Management and conservation of inland recreational fishing systems vary across the 
countries, and institutions cannot be transferred easily. Nonetheless, study of the fisheries 
management system in Japan could help better organize the recreational fisheries in Argentina. 
Outlining some aspects of recreational fishing in Japan, this activity has been mainly managed by 
local Fishing Cooperative Associations (FCAs), whose member organizations are local fishers 
that rely on fisheries and belong to regional fisheries federations. There are two types of 
associations: “inshore local fishery cooperative associations” that operate in ocean areas and 
“inland water fishermen’s cooperative associations” that use the resources from rivers and lakes 
[Hokimoto, 2009]. Fisheries in Japan are performed under a co-management regime. The 
government gives rights and licenses to local fishermen and FCAs. Such organizations that 
represent the fishermen manage the fisheries and establish rules and enforcement mechanisms on 
an autonomous basis [Matsuda et al., 2010:899], despite the existence of a prefectural fishing 
regulatory framework [Makino and Matsuda, 2005:445]. The government, in turn, supports their 
activities by providing legal and scientific information and financial assistance, thus lowering 
transactions costs [Makino and Matsuda, 2005:447-448].  
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Ruddle and Segi state that although inland recreational fishing is managed by local 
FCAs, marine recreational fishing is usually not properly managed, leading to conflicts and 
unsustainable use of resources [Ruddle and Segi, 2006]. Therefore, inland recreational fishing 
tends to be better organized in terms of conservation. Moreover, restocking programs are managed 
by fishing cooperatives that establish the time and areas of restocking. Alevins are bought from 
other facilities and reared on site, so that juveniles can be released into the water bodies, as was 
observed in Okutama Fishing Center in Tokyo, Japan. In the case of Kawaguchiko, its FCA 
organizes releasing programs of several species into the lake to foster recreational fishing 
[Kawaguchiko Fishery Cooperative Association, 2015]. Since the stock of fish fauna can 
contribute to the biodiversity of the aquatic environment as well as to recreational and artisanal 
fishing, the author intends to conduct further research in Japan so as to formulate programs that 
could promote fishing activities in the context of the Latin American region.  
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